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DISAGREEMENT, COGNITIVE COMMAND, AND
THE INDEXICALITY OF MORAL TRUTH
Abstract. Moral Relativism can be considered an attractive alternative to re-
alism because relativists can make good sense of cultural and societal disagree-
ments by seeing them as faultless. However, we can show that this advantage
is made possible by systematically disagreeing with moral phenomenology. Rel-
ativists make a substantial distinction between intercultural and intracultural
discourses which turns out to be incoherent. This can be shown by making use
of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command.
Keywords: relativism, metaethics, cognitive command, truth in ethics, disagree-
ment.
Although John Mackie claimed that his relativist argument is not as
important as the argument from queerness,1moral relativism is a widespread
alternative to moral realism and constructivism which has one of its most
profound advocates of our days in Gilbert Harman.
Mackie’s argument can appropriately be used as a starting point to
develop central thoughts of the relativist account in moral theory more
generally and from a more abstract point of view than Mackie intended.
The argument from relativity begins with the observation that obviously
there are variations in moral systems among different cultures and different
epochs. To use Mackie’s example, imagine two cultures which have divergent
opinions about monogamy and polygamy: within one culture people regard
the monogamist way of life as the right one, while people in another culture
claim that men have a right to marry several women (or even should do so).
Now, Mackie weighs two alternatives for the correct way to explain this
phenomenon: The divergent moral opinions among different cultures may
either be traced back to a collective failure in recognizing an objective moral
order or they are the result and the expression of different ways of life.
Since the first explanation consists in the implausible assumption that we
collectively fail to gain knowledge of an independent moral realm, Mackie
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draws the inference to the best explanation and assumes that moral codes
are reflections of culturally relative ways of life.2
1. Indexical Relativism and Faultless Disagreement
To understand the significance of Mackie’s argument, we have to distin-
guish two varieties of moral relativism and see how they are related to each
other.3 Moral relativists make use of a first-order and a second-order ap-
proach. The existence of divergent moral opinions among different cultures
and epochs forms the basis of first-order relativism:
First-Order Moral Relativism: Different societies, cultures, groups of persons
etc. have different moral opinions on the very same state of affairs. Addition-
ally, within one society, culture, group of persons etc. the moral opinion on
a given state of affairs differs from one time to another.
In this first-order approach moral relativism captures the phenomenon that
serves Mackie as an example, i.e. the fact that different cultures have differ-
ent opinions about the rightness or wrongness of polygamy. This approach,
however, is not the metaethically relevant challenge absolutist conceptions
of moral discourse have to meet. The existence of this form of moral dis-
agreement is—as Mackie puts it—“in itself merely a truth of descriptive
morality, a fact of anthropology”.4 The real challenge for an absolutist view
of moral truth like constructivism (or realism) is formulated on the sec-
ond order which is essentially a semantic statement about truth in moral
discourse:
Second-Order Moral Relativism: The different ways of life among various so-
cieties, cultures, groups of persons etc. constitute different moral frames of
reference. A moral assertion is true or false relative to these very frames of
reference.
Second-Order Moral Relativism is a statement about the indexicality of
moral truth.5 A sentence like “Polygamy is morally wrong” is not true sim-
pliciter but rather true relative to a given moral frame of reference and false
relative to another one. By indexing moral truth relativists do not assume
that moral disagreements are contradictions. If a moral sentence is true rel-
ative to one frame of reference and false to another one, then people from
these different cultures do not contradict each other. Just like the sentence
that an object is moving might be true relative to one frame of reference
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and false to another one is not a contradiction but a valid consequence from
the special theory of relativity.6
Arguments for moral relativism often take one of the following two
shapes: One might see First-Order Moral Relativism as an argument for the
metaethically relevant relativism on the second order7 or one might argue
for moral relativism because one has accepted a global version of alethic rel-
ativism which claims that the truth of all judgments is a relative matter and
that the relativity of moral truth follows from this more general assump-
tion. In what follows I will restrict myself to the first of these strategies
in order to show the argumentative connection of First- and Second-Order
Moral Relativism. However, at the end of this section we will hopefully see
that moral relativism loses its appeal as an alternative to moral construc-
tivism because relativists cannot account for genuine normative features
inherent to the notion of disagreement. To show this I will develop an argu-
ment which is motivated by a thought experiment Gottlob Frege proposes
against psychologism in the philosophy of logic.
Second-Order Moral Relativism does not simply follow from First-Order
Moral Relativism. An important argumentative brick to establish rela-
tivism on the second order consists in the assumption that the fundamen-
tal disagreements—which are described in First-Order Moral Relativism—
cannot be rationally resolved. However, before we can investigate such an
argument for moral relativism based on disagreement it is important to note
that it is far from obvious of what kind the disagreements between various
cultures are. Over what do different cultures actually disagree and do these
disagreements outweigh the agreements between those cultures? As Mackie
noticed, there may be fundamental agreements over basic moral principles
like “It is morally good to be honest” or “Torturing innocent people is
morally wrong”.8 Disagreements may then result from different interpreta-
tions of such principles in various contexts. From the assumption that two
different societies agree that you should not torture innocent people it does
not follow that it is impossible for a specific person to be tortured in one
society but not in the other—simply because the two societies may have
different views on the matter who has to be considered as innocent.9 The
significant form of disagreement for relativism has to be on this level of in-
terpreting more basal moral standards since the respective interpretations
result from a culture’s specific way of life which establishes the frame of
reference within which moral evaluation takes place.
The relativist’s assumption that moral disagreement is not rationally
resolvable amounts to the thesis that even under epistemically ideal con-
ditions these disagreements would stand. An argument to explain moral
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disagreement under epistemically ideal conditions might take the following
form: What is morally right and wrong can be derived from assumptions
about the basic needs and ends of persons within a society. Due to historical
and sociological reasons these needs and ends differ among the plurality of
societies in such a way that even if every member of every society would fol-
low the consequences of his or her basic assumptions in a perfectly rational
way, then the outcome about what is right and wrong would still be dif-
ferent. Therefore, even among societies under epistemically ideal conditions
moral disagreement would obtain.10 This argument rest on the assumption
that the basic needs and ends are themselves not object of evaluation but
rather provide the fixed basis of deliberation. Consequently, this view might
result in the implausible thesis that moral change and development within
a given society is, strictly speaking, not possible because the starting point
of moral deliberation always stays the same. However, this pretty simple
objection does not stand against relativism. Of course, the relativist is not
committed to accept the assumption of unchangeable needs and ends in or-
der to present this kind of argument. A relativist theory might allow that
the basis of deliberation becomes itself the object of deliberation. When
it comes to moral dilemmas, for example, certain conflicting ends can be
weighed against each other. Poring over the question which of these ends
is favorable and which has to be discarded does, however, not happen in
a reflective sphere which is free from any assumption. The other needs and
ends and certain established opinions remain in charge and provide the ba-
sis for a deliberation over those conflicting ends. Therefore, relativists make
use of the fairly plausible assumption that every basic need or end can be
scrutinized but not all at the same time.11
Second-Order Moral Relativism can be seen as a way to capture the non-
reducibility of moral disagreement by indexing the notion of moral truth.
Disagreements must therefore be seen as faultless differences of opinions.12
Accordingly, moral relativism is a theory about the indexicality of moral
truth which rests on the assumption that disagreements about what is right
and wrong are not rationally resolvable.
Relativists are not committed to accept ontological implications of
moral sentences because these sentences do not purport to describe the
elements of the naked ‘fabric of the world’. Due to this understanding of
ontology and moral language relativists rely on the same two fundamental
assumptions as constructivists do: (i.) There are no moral facts existing in-
dependently of the personal standpoint but nevertheless (ii.) moral discourse
is objective, i.e. moral utterances do not lack truth-values. Hence, moral rel-
ativism is a systematic combination of anti-realism and cognitivism. This
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is why relativist approaches can be considered as an attractive alternative
to realism when one has abandoned the realist’s idea of an autarkic moral
realm.13
2. Cognitive Command
Nevertheless, despite of this consensus in systematic pre-decisions rela-
tivists miss a normative feature of disagreement which is captured by other
cognitivist approaches like realism or constructivism. This can be shown by
an elaboration of Crispin Wright’s notion of Cognitive Command which he
presents in his seminal Truth and Objectivity.14 As long as relativists can-
not account for the normative dimension of disagreement we gain from the
notion of Cognitive Command, their theories dash against the peculiarities
of actual moral discourse.
Wright characterizes Cognitive Command as a discourse’s feature that
is a priori that differences of opinion on one and the same state of affairs
are explainable only in terms of (i.) different information of the disputants,
(ii.) unsuitable conditions, or (iii.) malfunction in reasoning. This means
that every disagreement results from a cognitive shortcoming. Every dis-
course which has this feature at its disposal exhibits Cognitive Command.15
According to Wright, the Cognitive Command constraint divides is an
essential element of realist discourses but we will see that it is also at work
in moral discourses from a relativist point of view—to be more precise:
according to relativists, it is at work in some discourses (which is exactly
the problem). Wright sees the Cognitive Command constraint as a tool to
indicate realist discourses because he assumes that cognitivism is a matter
of representationalism:
...the truth is that the constraint does not reflect a wholly primitive charac-
teristic of the notions of objectivity and cognitive engagement but derives its
appeal, at least in part, from a truism to do with the idea of representation.
For to think of oneself as functioning in purely cognitive mode, as it were,
is, when the products of this function are to be beliefs, to think of oneself as
functioning in representational mode.16
However, it is also possible for anti-realist conceptions to state that a specific
discourse (from an anti-realist point of view) exhibits Cognitive Command.
The anti-realist simply has to assume that being in a cognitive mode does
not necessarily amount to being in a representational mode. If, for instance,
the syntactical structure of a given discourse is clear enough to fix the
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rules of how to use the expressions in this discourse—as it is in mathemati-
cal discourse—than cognitive shortcomings can easily be explained without
saying that they result from a failure in representation. Disagreements may
then result from malfunction in reasoning. Therefore, Wright claims that
Cognitive Command is just one element in an elaboration of a substantial
realist theory:
I do not think that if a discourse exerts Cognitive Command, that immedi-
ately takes us all the way to a vindication of an intuitive realism. One can
readily envisage the rules of assessment for a particular class of statements
being so tightly circumscribed that Cognitive Command was ensured and yet
reason remaining to doubt that the statements in question were genuinely rep-
resentational. Any non-realist about, say, elementary arithmetical statements
is implicitly taking just such a view, since it seems impossible to understand
how a disagreement about the status or result of an elementary calculation
might be sustained without some cognitive shortcoming featuring in its expla-
nation.17
Clearly the Cognitive Command constraint can divide between realism
and some anti-realist conceptions. Emotivism, for instance, is a form of
anti-realism which does not exhibit Cognitive Command. In emotivist ap-
proaches, disagreements cannot be traced back to a cognitive shortcoming
of one of the disputants because being engaged in moral evaluations is,
according to the emotivist, no cognitive business at all.
That the Cognitive Command constraint is, however, also at work in
some variants of anti-realism becomes obvious when we call to mind that not
every anti-realist theory lets loose of a conception of truth—or somewhat
weaker: a criterion for correctness of judgments. As soon as there is a mea-
surement for truth and falsity which does not rest in the arbitrary decisions
or attitudes of the individual subject, then we have a criterion at hand
which indicates cognitive shortcomings. Relativism, indeed, is such a vari-
ant of anti-realism in which the distinction between correct and incorrect
moral judgments is possible. According to the relativist, correct judgments
are those which are in line with the respective frame of reference whereas
incorrect judgments are in contradiction with this moral code. If someone
makes an incorrect judgment, she must have done something wrong in com-
ing to this conclusion. This means that incorrect moral judgments result
from a cognitive shortcoming.
This notion of Cognitive Command forces the relativist to accept two
assumptions from which we can draw an inherently implausible conclusion.
1. As we see from the argument for Second-Order Moral Relativism
above, the three possible explanations of differences of opinion are, by hy-
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pothesis, excluded. Relativists assume that even under conditions which
are epistemically ideal—that is, in which everybody has the same infor-
mation, can assess the same data and is perfectly reasonable—divergent
opinions across different societies would still remain. Therefore relativists
have to assume that a discourse between two or more societies which do not
share the same moral frame of reference (and therefore disagree with each
other) exhibits no Cognitive Command at all. In such cases the differences
of opinion are not due to cognitive shortcomings but reflect different ways
of life.
2. However, relativists have to assume that a discourse within one and
the same society exhibits Cognitive Command. If two persons who share
the same moral frame of reference disagree over a specific state of affairs
then this disagreement is resolvable under epistemically ideal conditions,
i.e. disagreements within one and the same society result from cognitive
shortcomings. Otherwise the relativist would have to assume that every
person exhibits his or her own way of life which constitutes his or her own
moral frame of reference. Obviously, this cannot be the relativist’s goal
because then relativism would lapse into subjectivism.
Now, the relativist has not only to assume that intercultural moral
discourses exhibit no Cognitive Command at all whereas discourses within
a single culture have this feature at their disposal. Since relativists have
to make the two assumptions above due to conceptual reasons, their the-
oretical commitment can be formulated even stronger: It is impossible for
intercultural moral discourse to possess Cognitive Command and it is neces-
sary for moral discourse within one and the same culture to exhibit Cogni-
tive Command. This means that relativists must assume that there are
two kinds of discourses with necessarily different features—intracultural
discourse which encompasses a normative dimension and intercultural dis-
course which misses this dimension. That this is a fairly implausible as-
sumption can be seen by the obvious fact that there is absolutely no differ-
ence in the usage of moral vocabulary between intercultural discourse and
discourse within one society. Between different societies as well as within
a single society we entertain both “kinds” of discourses over the same states
of affairs, namely the actions of persons, and with the same vocabulary reg-
ulated by the same syntactic constraints. Following the relativist’s thought
that intercultural discourse exhibits no Cognitive Command, i.e. that dis-
agreements in such discourses are faultless, amounts to the thesis that in-
tercultural discourse actually is no discourse at all. The relativist has to as-
sume that intercultural dialogues are rather unconnected monologues. The
implausible result is that two persons who do not share the same moral
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frame of reference and who are arguing over a specific moral state of af-
fairs are—strictly speaking—not talking to each other. Hence, relativism
amounts to the assumption that moral discourses differ in function although
there is no difference in form. Relativists draw a line where moral discourse
does not.
3. A Normative Dimension of Disagreement
We can diagnose as this problem’s root a misconception of the notion
of disagreement. Relativists need to see certain disagreements as faultless.
Otherwise there could not be the manifold of moral frames of reference they
postulate. But this seems to be a theoretical construction of disagreement
which does not match the moral discourse we actually experience and en-
tertain. Faultless disagreements contradict moral phenomenology because
they imply that the disputants are not carrying out a genuine discourse at
all. Although relativists can explain actual moral disagreement and use this
phenomenon as their systematic starting point, they can hardly render the
convergences in moral opinions across different societies. These convergences
are an actuality of moral phenomenology which manifest, most famously, in
the development of the human rights over the last centuries. Second-Order
Moral Relativism misses this point because it cannot account for a univer-
sal normative dimension which is inherent to the notion of disagreement.
Conflicting views—within one society or across different societies—raise the
irreducibly normative question “who is right?”. Persons of all societies share
this normative demand for solution when they are confronted with cases of
disagreement—moral or other.18
Conflicting views over moral states of affairs are not the end of the
story. Eventually, this is where our moral practice starts. Which one of two
or more conflicting views prevails over the others is not a descriptive matter
of power politics but rather a genuinely normative matter which involves
moral decisions over the questions whether this or that view is the right one
or the one that should be preferred. Disagreements open up an irreducibly
normative dimension.19 The relativist cannot allow the normative question
“who is right?” to come up although it is an essential part of the dialogical
structure of moral discourse which cannot be restricted to particular frames
of reference. Normative constraints are rather inseparably connected with
the constitution of rational beings in general, i.e. with every person despite
of all frames. Normativity is, I am tempted to say, the condition of the
possibility of establishing moral frames at all.
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N O T E S
1 See Mackie, 1977, pp. 36–38.
2 Mackie’s argumentation might be a bit incoherent at this point. On the one hand he
assumes that a collective failure cannot be considered a plausible explanation for divergent
moral opinions while, on the other hand, his assumption that we systematically err in
moral discourse is, of course, a fundamental element of his error theory.
3 The following outline of relativism is necessarily incomplete. As a philosophical po-
sition, relativism has taken too many forms across the millennia which makes it nearly
impossible to give a precise definition of relativism.
4 Mackie, 1977, p. 36.
5 I am restricting myself to such varieties of relativism which index the notion of moral
truth. Of course, there are other varieties which, for example, index the notions ‘right’
and ‘wrong’ or make no use of indexicality at all. These latter varieties may be regarded
as genuine relativist theories while the varieties I discuss can be seen as a form of contex-
tualism. See Ko¨lbel, 2004a.
6 See Harman, forthcoming.
7 See, e.g., Harman, 1975 or Wellman, 1963.
8 See Mackie, 1977, p. 38.
9 On this basis one may argue that persons among different cultures share a ‘universal
minimal morality’. See Walzer, 1994. A somewhat similar account (though with quite
different implications) may be a ‘Core I-Morality’ which is proposed in Harman, forth-
coming.
10 See for a similar reconstruction of this argument Shafer-Landau, R. (2003), p. 221.
However, Shafer-Landau does not restrict this argument to moral relativism but ascribes
it to anti-realism in general.
11 Russ Shafer-Landau seems to miss this point in his reconstruction of this argument.
See Shafer-Landau, 2003, pp. 221–222.
12 This means that disagreements cannot be treated as contradictions, i.e. from this
form of differences of opinions it does not follow that one person (or society) is necessarily
in error. See, e.g., Ko¨lbel, 2004b; Ko¨lbel, 2009; MacFarlane, 2007.
13 This might be hidden in Onora O’Neill’s remark about the placement of constructivism
“somewhere in the place between realism and relativism.” (O’Neill, 1988, p. 1).
14 Wright has presented this conception earlier under the name “Rational Command”
in Wright, 1988.
15 See Wright, 1994, pp. 92–93.
16 Wright, 1994, p. 146.
17 Wright, 1994, pp. 147–148.
18 Frege also uses the normative dimension of disagreements to argue against psycholo-
gism (a position which, interestingly, can be seen as a sort of species relativism). See the
introduction to Frege, 1893. An excellent elaboration of the thought experiment Frege
develops there can be found in Conant, 1992.
19 Huw Price makes a similar point with regard to the notion of truth which he sees
as a norm that regulates discourses by providing them with a distinctively normative
dimension:
[Truth] is a norm which speakers immediately assume to be breached by someone with
whom they disagree, independently of any diagnosis of the source of the disagreement.
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Indeed, this is the very essence of the norm of truth, in my view. It gives disagree-
ment its immediate normative character, a character on which dialogue depends, and
a character which no lesser norm could provide. (Price, 2003, p. 164.)
Price takes the notion of truth as the source of normativity in disagreements whereas
I assume that “disagreement” is a normative notion on its own.
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